Etude de l'armée allemande sur le pic

The report is 99 pages so I only translated some bits and pieces. I will try to translate the table of contents and the lead paragraphs.

1. Introduction
2. The Importance of Oil
2.1. Oil as a Determinant of Globalization
2.2. Aspects of German Energy Security
3. Possible Developments after Global Peak Oil

3.1. General Peak-Oil-Induced Causal Relationships
3.1.1. Oil becomes a crucial factor of (re-)shaping international relations
The share of globally and freely accessible oil traded on markets will decline in favor of oil traded through binational contracts. Economic strength, military might, or nuclear weapons turn into a paramount instrument of power projection and a determining factor of new dependency relationships in international relations.
- Appreciation of producing nations within the international system
- Conditioning of supply relationships
- Volatility and loss of trust
- Supply diversification becomes more difficult
- Geopolitical turnover and new strategic alliances
- Undermining of value-oriented foreign policy
- Shifts of power in international organizations towards big emerging countries

3.1.2. The development of additional and alternative energy sources creates new security challenges
The decline of conventional oil reserves under the conditions of Peak Oil causes alternative energy sources to gain importance. That includes as yet to be developed unconventional oil and gas resources, coal and nuclear, as well as renewables. The use of those resources implies new security policy challenges.
- Contest for oil sources in disputed regions or international waters
- Natural gas as an extension of the oil age
- Expansion of nuclear power and increased proliferation
- Growing global production of fuels competes with food production for arable land
- Striving for energy independence makes infrastructures more critical and leads to large "energy regions"

3.1.3. The roles of states and private economic actors shift
Private actors traditionally play a central -but as yet purely economic- part in oil exploration and extraction. After realizing Peak Oil, states will push even more for security of oil supply while companies are confronted with situations where taking over functions traditionally fulfilled by states seems sensible or essential. Three areas stand out: Contest for drilling licenses, organizing security, and the protection of oil infrastructures.

3.1.4. The transition to a post-fossil society leads to economic and political crises
Modern economies have developed on the basis of cheap fossil resources, esp. oil. Individual and commercial transport are oil-based. Highly increased oil prices will have massive effects in both areas. The security-political implications are a fragmentation of societies that are most affected and economic and political systemic crises.
- Curtailments in individual and commercial transport
- Food security threatened
- Transformation of economic structures
- More regulation, less market
- Society loses trust

3.1.5. Interventions become more selective - actors are overstrained
Peak oil will pose to most states enormous economic, political, and financial challenges. The massive burden to economic, political, and financial systems and fuel shortages will lead to a curtailment of options for transporting large goods over long distances. Therefore interventions of all kinds will become more expensive and difficult for all relevant actors while the number and intensity of internal problems will decrease attention and available resources. Actors (NGOs included) can operate only selectively.
- Focusing on one's own problems

3.2. Systemic risk whilst crossing the "Tipping Point"
- Total Liquids production declines
- Short term, the world economy contracts proportionally to the decline of oil supply
- Medium term, the global economic system and every market economy collapse (see also bullet point 4 of my initial post)

4. Challenges for Germany
4.1. Danger of new dependency relationships for Germany
Gas perpetuates the security challenges of Peak Oil and becomes an important "second political currency".

4.2. Heightened Focus of politics on supply relationships
Concentration of remaning reserves in the "strategic ellipsis" and difficult diversification cause (a) an appreciation of producing countries in the region and (b) an increased interference of outside powers to ensure their interests and resources. There is a danger that producing nations will exploit their position of power, form alliances along ideological fault lines and aggressively pursue their goals.

4.3. Foreign policy becomes more pragmatic
Peak Oil forces the primacy of securing energy and increases pragmatism and politics of interest in international relations to the disadvantage of value-oriented foreign policy.

4.4. Shaping power and importance of western industrial nations declines
New partnerships between big emerging economies and resource-rich developing countries will be forged. There will be more catering to the 'clientele' within international organizations. The position of western industrial countries is weakened.

4.5. Helping to stabilize fragile producing nations
The multiple challenges of PO will weaken the performance of states. This will lead to more weak or failed states. Oil extraction&export however require a stable framework. If governments cannot guarantee stability, the probability that such functions (including use of force) are performed by third parties will increase. The relevant actors could be non-governmental, sub-governmental, or governmental. Consequences include a displacement of governmental structures or dominance by private and half-governmental actors but also foreign powers.

4.6. Potential for conflict in the Arctic grows
The ambiguity of the apportionment of arctic areas and their resources increases the conflict potential between neighboring countries, esp. when PO happens.

4.7. Proliferation of nuclear technology & materials
With the expected expansion of nuclear power under PO, the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials will increase. That will increase the number of real or potential nuclear powers. An increased risk of terrorist use of nuclear material or accidents.

4.8. Heightened potential for conflict of KRITIS (critical infrastructure)
Oil and gas infrastructures become more attractive as targets of violent conflict and political blackmail. Infrastructures for electrial energy become even more critical. The need for investing in direct and indirect protection measures will increase. Non-state actors will play an increasing role.

4.9. Large energy regions change alliance systems
Building out new energy regions will not only be a technical and ecomic challenge but will also be linked to security-political processes to ensure stable conditions in changing environment.

4.10. Peak oil for militaries
A massive reduction of mobility has huge implications for training, equipment and above all global abilitiy of armies to project and intervene. Short-term solutions will have to include alternative liquid fuels. In the medium/long-term armies will have to transform towards post-fossil mobilty alongside societies and economies.

4.11. Oil as a systemic risk
A fundamental problem of security-political challenges of PO is the systemic nature of scarce and expensive oil in a complex economic environment. The transmission channels of an oil price shock include very different, interdependent and partly essential infrastructures. Consequences are therefore not entirely predictable.

5. Conclusions
The two and a half page long conclusion deserves a post of its own.

Appendix FAQ
1. What is Peak Oil?
2. How do critics argue against Peak Oil?
3. What kind of resources are there?
4. What is the difference between conventionals and unconventionals?
5. What about new oil finds?
6. How do refineries work?
7. How does EROI influence the oil price?
8. Are there ways to deal with Peak Oil?

My summary of Chapter 5 Conclusions:

Thinking about PO can't be led by everyday observations and historical parallels. Envisioning the consequences of a successive deprivation of the most important energy source is therefore hard. Psychological barriers suppress irrefutable facts and dealing with the topic.

But PO is inevitable. This partial study shows there is a substantial risk that a scarcity-induced transformation phase will not happen without frictions in the security-political arena. The desintegration of complex economic systems and their infrastructures has grave consequences, esp. in industrial countries.

Our results show there is great uncertainty regarding the development of Germany following PO. It's possible to name concrete dangers but that shouldn't hide the fact that most of the coming challenges are in the dark. Probably the most effective strategies are not only goal-oriented measures to facilitate an early shift of the economy and energy supply but also the development of systemic virtues such as independence, flexibility, and redundancy.

The most important security-political change is the coming appreciation of the MidEast, Africa, and the Caspian region for Germany's energy supply. The possiblities for Germany's foreign policy within a dialogue with exporting and transit countries could be widened. But for that German interests would have to clearly defined, intra-European differences regarding the approach to those regions would have to be overcome, and the chances to include influential actors like China in finding political solutions in those regions would have to be seized.

Policy towards Russia should be more balanced between national and European energy interests. A differentiated energy foreign policy should be conceded to Moskau, even vis-a-vis EU members. At the same time this must not lead to Russia dividing Europe too much over questions of energy security. The hitherto existing strategy of assisting integration on a corporate level seems to show promise but should be continued in a larger European context.

Efforts will have to be made in government, between different departments and levels, to better understand and control the complex interdependencies of value chains and infrastructures. A revaluation of criteria is necessary: not only efficiency but robustness will be a hallmark of sustainable policies.

The transformation to a post-fossil society is especially dependent on the availability of non-fossil technologies. Here too, sustainable solutions seem problematic. Substituting a dependence for another (e.g. rare metals) is not productive in the long term. Non-fossil transport will be a core competence of post-fossil societies.

PO poses dangers for mission-critical abilities of armies. Strategic and tactical mobility and avoiding a loss of functionality have to be paramount. Advancing and optimizing current procedures and supply chains is therefore not sufficient. Future changes have to reduce systemic dependencies and avoid them altogether in new structures. Identifying those dependencies requires new methods and deeper analysis.

To draw conclusions about future mission environments of the Bundeswehr from a single-topic study is certainly not admissible. But it's probable that PO will lead to more fragile states and humanitarian crises. Parts of the Mideast will profit, resource-poor countries in central Africa will have massive problems. Collapses of economic systems, undersupply and humanitarian emergencies will make transnational political upheavals very probable. Weak governmental structures further increase the danger - even industrial nations will be limited in their efforts to counter PO. This study has therefore addressed (1) food security, (2) concurrent political instability, and (3) a tighter resource-political connection to those regions. Additionally, the Mideast and Africa border on EU and NATO and are therefore important security factors for Germany.

The results of this study are starting points for further research. However, this should not hide the fact that implementation will be the biggest hurdle to preparing the German economy for PO. The concurrent paradigm change of less efficiency and more robustness contradicts economic logic and can therefore not be left to market forces alone.

A preparation for PO is necessary even if the scenarios in this study don't come to pass. The time factor can be decisive for a successful transformation to a post-fossil society. To accelerate democratic decisions in this regard, the dangers of an eroding resource base have to be implanted in our social consciousness. Only then will there be an awareness/acceptance of the coming change of course. At the same time, chances for autonomous preparation have to be tested and seized. Decentralized solutions can be supported by central hubs but they can usually not be developed and implemented by them.

the_oliver_2000 a écrit:

Je n'ai pas vraiment de réponse, mais ça me surprend. N'est ce pas une façon d'alerter l'opinion par la bande, en ne mouillant personne en particulier ?

Alain75 a écrit:Un article dans le Monde relate l'étude :

http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2010/09/11/l-armee-allemande-predit-le-pire-une-fois-le-pic-petrolier-atteint_1409882_3244.html

Les commentaires sont assez édifiants ...

CHAMPIGNAC
11.09.10 | 17h18

Les prophètes de malheur continuent de sévir : aucun n'envisage que l'homme trouvera de nouvelles sources de pétrole, ou un succédané au pétrole (procédé Fischer-Tropsch qui a permis le ravitaillement en carburant, à partir du charbon, de l'armée Allemande de la WWII), ou une source d'énergie nouvelle à laquelle personne ne pense encore. Il y a deux cent ans, Napoléon avait-il la moindre idée des énergies d'aujourd'hui ? Les Philipullus ont le nez dans le guidon, qui constitue leur limite.

Pierre M. Boriliens a écrit:

CHAMPIGNAC
11.09.10 | 17h18

Les prophètes de malheur continuent de sévir : aucun n'envisage que l'homme trouvera de nouvelles sources de pétrole, ou un succédané au pétrole (procédé Fischer-Tropsch qui a permis le ravitaillement en carburant, à partir du charbon, de l'armée Allemande de la WWII), ou une source d'énergie nouvelle à laquelle personne ne pense encore. Il y a deux cent ans, Napoléon avait-il la moindre idée des énergies d'aujourd'hui ? Les Philipullus ont le nez dans le guidon, qui constitue leur limite.

Et c'est pour ça que la retraite de Russie s'est faite à pied... et non avec le plein d'énergies inconnues...

Pierre M. Boriliens a écrit:
Je trouve que ça s'arrange un peu, avec le temps : à part quelques dénis francs, massifs et ridicules, les autres semblent convaincus du problème. Evidemment, beaucoup en sont encore à s'imaginer qu'il y a des solutions techniques, et que pas grand chose ne changera une fois celles-ci mises en oeuvre. Mais je constate qu'il n'y a plus ces réactions goguenardes et amusées, voire de mépris, à l'égard de ceux qui prévoient le pîre...

Alain75 a écrit:Un article dans le Monde relate l'étude :

http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2010/09/11/l-armee-allemande-predit-le-pire-une-fois-le-pic-petrolier-atteint_1409882_3244.html

Les commentaires sont assez édifiants ...

En 2012, les surplus de capacité de production de pétrole pourraient disparaître entièrement, et dès 2015, le déficit de production pourrait être proche de 10 millions de barils par jour.

alter egaux a écrit:Ce qui m'inquiète, c'est que les scientifiques américains n'ont pratiquement plus le droit de communiquer sur le PO. L'administration est au courant, mais black out total.
Un peu comme pour le 911 : ils savaient, mais n'ont rien "fait" pour éviter le choc.

Cela rejoint l'idée que le PO est "souhaité". Pas le pic de production, mais le choc dû au pic. Et à priori, vu l'empressement de nous "informer", ils veulent un choc violent et ravageur.
Pas de doute, ils vont l'avoir...

La "stratégie de choc" continue, et les peakistes ressemblent de plus en plus à des Cassandres seules dans la ville de Troie.

Bracing For Peak Oil Production By Decade's End